Leaving Afghanistan

 

Like so many Afghan Vets the formalization of the departure of the US from Afghanistan conjures up all sorts of reactions. For so many of us, for so long it has defined much of our military service.  Younger members will have other theaters but for many in their 40s – early 70s (yes..we have Afghan Vets now turning 70 +) Afghan was a defining deployment.  I’ve deployed to the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, visited literally countless other war zones and countries and despite many defining moments (including Rwanda in ’94) none of have defined my world view as much as my time in Afghanistan.

I first deployed to Kandahar in March of 2002 and left for the last time in June of 2012, with dozens of visits in between. I’ve been in every region of the country, met with an unending number of Afghan leaders. But the real impact is the memories of those with whom I served, their sacrifices both the ultimate, and enduring, ones.

Much is made of the failure of close to 20 years and how the boundless optimism by so many leaders was unfounded. It is quite topical to blame Senior Military Leaders at the moment, and although much is fully deserved some of it is misplaced. I can’t help but think that Afghanistan is an example. Did we fail: Yes, but I would argue not in the way that many suggest.  A review of the mission and its morphing is, I think supportive of my view.

When the US led coalition deployed in 2001 (of which a Special Operations Task Force from Canada was an integral part) it was ostensibly to prevent Afghanistan from remaining a Terrorist Safe Haven and operating base for the Al Qaeda. Following 9/11 it must also be admitted that punishment and retribution were an equal part of the equation.  The Taliban’s refusal to meet American demands regarding the protection of the AQ allowed the US to take action. There can be a useful discussion about the basis for such action but I don’t believe that was the actual tipping point. I think it was when the US decided it needed to replace the Taliban Government and charged the CIA with that objective. From there it was a quick step to inserting themselves into the Nation Building agenda, or at least the objectives started to reflect such an agenda despite every effort to avoid such a label.

With the distraction of the Iraq campaign whatever momentum that was created in Afghanistan was lost. Too few resources over too many demands in one too many theatres often spells disaster: history is replete with such examples. But that too, I would argue, was not the military failure.  The military failure was allowing Civilian Western Leadership to continue to get away with thinking there was a military solution to the Afghanistan conundrum.

In this I am strongly biased based on my experiences there. From my very first deployment where our SOTF was involved in Direct Action Operations designed to make Coalition Forces safer from IED Cells and those that would do us harm to my final appointment as the General Officer responsible for the Operations of training the Afghan Army, Policy, Airforce, and Special Operations as well as the provision of advice to the Ministries of Defence and Interior it was clear to me that military operations could never land the victory Wester leaders sought. It was clear to every General Officer who has ever served there as a General Officer. Nothing replaces the experience of that level of deployment for forcing you to address, head on, the harsh realities of working in chaos.

It didn’t matter what training systems we created, bases we built, equipment we bought, advice and assistance on the battlefield we provided. However necessary these activities were they were never going to be sufficient. The sufficient activities would address the systemic corruption at all levels, the lack of an education system that would create future Afghan leaders, let alone the establishment of a viable economy. Nor did we address the all-pervasive ethnic hatred that permeated every conversation with every Afghan Leader I have every spoken to, up to and including the current President.

So what was the failure and what might be the lesson we should strive to learn. The failure was twofold: First that we failed to convince our Political Leaders (because we failed to convince ourselves) that the only path to success should we wish to rebuild a nation was to focus upon those elements that a nation needs to be a stable and functioning state. We are not talking about recreating Canada or Norway but rather a place where the basic elements of human dignity can be enjoyed by every citizen. I can’t recount the number of briefs where the central message to Government Officials was “we are not the solution”  “we can create temporary security and stability but only when we are present”  “unless you address the systemic state wide issues we will merely be mowing the grass” We failed to make that message stick.

Our second failure was the constant optimism and messaging to Canadians. We must learn to be more honest, more direct, with less prevacation on the situation on the ground.  We allowed the pride in the performance of Canadians to be the message. For fear of not having their sacrifices recognized there was a focus on what good they were doing. We failed to add “but it will all be utterly irrelevant, if NATO and its national governments don’t invest, in a serious way, in the type of state wide evolution need to make sustainable change”

So, with those two underlying failures what is the lesson learned. I believe it is this: Western Military Forces, and in particular Combat Forces are really good at certain things. I mean really really good. Don’t believe what those who have never experienced this for themselves. When it comes to actual combat operations there is little that nations such as Canada cannot do. But hard on the heels of such an assertion we must accept, at the beginning not the end of a mission, that there are very few, possibly zero, problems which can be solved by such combat. We can win on the battlefield for however long we decide to fight but until the underlying elements that created the conflict are addressed it will be to no avail. So, in many instances successful combat is necessary to create the conditions to embark on the larger effort and absolutely needed to maintain some level of stability and security until civil society becomes self-sustaining. This caveat must be clear at the beginning and end of every brief to every civilian politician who wishes to deploy a military force in support of a Foreign Policy Objective.

So how should we think about the Afghan Mission. How do we rationalize the terrible cost so many paid and so many continue to pay. Firstly let’s accept Canada had no realistic opportunity to decline to be involved. We did not deploy because we loved Afghans and wanted them to enjoy a better life. We participated because Washington demanded that the world line up in support. “With Us or Against Us” had real meaning. For those who might suggest that this was avoidable I’d suggest they’ve never worked in a Government Policy shop. Having lead the DND International Security Division following my final deployment I have pretty firm views about realpolitik as it is practiced at the most senior of levels. So maybe for self-preservation of my mental wellbeing, or maybe because I want to believe that military service has meaning I think that Canada was right to participate, that the price we paid was for the good of Canada. It will always be too high but it was not meaningless to me.   

The principles of war used to teach that Selection and Maintenance of the Aim is central to any success. We allowed our aim to change without any change to approach and resources. Every man and woman who served in Afghanistan did exactly what we asked them to do. So often they did so brilliantly. We failed them, they did not fail.