Woke, Weakness and The Warrior Spirit

 

It has become fashionable in Academia and the Media to demonize that term “Warrior.”  Based on how they use it and the connotations they apply consequently I fully understand and endorse such condemnation. I, however, do not associated the word “Warrior” with the trappings they apply and so will continue to consider it as the best expression possible that captures my thoughts on what it means to be a member of the Profession of Arms.

One of the things that my own journey in higher education is teaching me is that choosing those ideas that appeal to one and rejecting those that don’t is very much at the heart of the intellectual debate. I don’t mean to suggest that it isn’t done with thought and rigorous analysis but rather to reflect that such contentions are core to improving the actual discussion. So, I choose to adopt the ideas of the Warrior Spirit as used for so long by the late Dr Bill Bentley.  A champion of Clausewitz and Design Thinking, Bill would often tell me when we worked together that the needed component to be successful in the Profession of Arms was a Warrior’s Spirit. He described this has having the Physical, Mental, Spiritual and Emotional elements necessary to engage in the fight. He understood, much earlier than I did, how this was an equation of multiplication vice addition. Meaning if just one of those elements had zero value, then the output was automatically zero. Each was necessary, none were capable of offsetting a shortfall of another let along being sufficient on their own.

I think about this and Bill’s thoughts, a lot. Pretty much everyday.

I’m also aware that the quality of the public dialogue has been cheapened by a number of major elements including but likely not restricted to the advent of Social Media, the evolution of Main Stream Media, as well as the increased populism of both Left and Right aligned Politicians. I am sure that there is more that has diminished this conversation but itemizing these is sufficient to demonstrate my point. The privileging of ideas in Academia is excusable when supported by deep thought, analysis and substantiated by evidence. The evidentiary cherry picking by individuals who lack all of those redeeming features should be seen as an anathema, rather than the gospel so many consider it to be.  

I, like so many, watched the 6^th January attack on Capital Hill with horror. Not because of the violence, which to many was shocking but to most military pers with deployed experience would not be so jarring as an actual activity. What was jarring was that it could happen in a Western Democracy and quite frankly one just south of our border.  But if that event was unsettling, the follow-on debate, including the attacking of serving members for being “Woke” when daring to speak critically of those moments has been, for me at least, even more worrisome.

Ultimately, I have interpreted that criticism as being essentially: “If you care to inform yourself, if you are determined to care for others regardless of their circumstance then you are Woke and that is weak and that diminishes our military capability.”  Applying my view of the Warrior Spirit the exact opposite is true. If you are not constantly trying to improve your understanding of the operating environment, informed by deep and comprehensive study and if you have no compassion for your fellow human beings then you are failing on every element that is essential to success.

This is not to say that I don’t have concerns about the readiness of our military nor that they are being gradually weakened.  For those with whom I have worked you will fully anticipate this: We are increasingly fat and lazy as a military force. I have always believed that there is a direct cost to this now systemic challenge. I wrote an additional number of paragraphs on this but having re read them realized they were a distraction from my main point which is if being Woke is being better informed and caring more, than it contributes to vice takes away from our Warrior Spirit. I can’t help but add this is not a generational issue as the young women and men joining are neither less or more fit than previous but rather those in their 30s, 40s and 50s who have simply just stopped trying to be deployably fit. ..but I digress.

Obviously, given my background, I am more than comfortable with the application of violence, or the threat thereof, to achieve a policy objective. Many people don’t like that idea. In fact, most assiduously avoid such direct language. But such avoidance has no bearing on the actual reality of why we have a military force. Yes the CAF can fill sand bags, it can help in LTC homes and it can do many of those things well when needed. Indeed, it should. But that is not our raison d’etre.  A nation’s military is designed with purpose and focus: To fight. The word “Warrior” seems far too aggressive for some. Those are invariably in two groups: There are those who do not believe in military force regardless of circumstance. I admire these people (whilst thinking them utterly naïve) and remain grateful for their voices. The other group just want to avoid thinking about the things they might agree are necessary but would prefer to use language that doesn’t force them to think about the reality of conflict and what it means. I reserve all of my disdain for such individuals.

The reality is that the world is becoming more not less chaotic. The fight of our lifetime, that of climate change, will indisputably make regional conflict more not less common. It will make those conflicts harder to fight in every single way. Do we need to be fitter to be ready to engage in those conflicts, absolutely, but equally inarguably and additionally we need to actually be “more Woke.” To prepare our team to fight effectively we must inculcate a Warrior’s Spirit described by whatever language you wish to adopt. Being Woke, adds to, does not diminish the Warrior.  

Leaving Afghanistan

 

Like so many Afghan Vets the formalization of the departure of the US from Afghanistan conjures up all sorts of reactions. For so many of us, for so long it has defined much of our military service.  Younger members will have other theaters but for many in their 40s – early 70s (yes..we have Afghan Vets now turning 70 +) Afghan was a defining deployment.  I’ve deployed to the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, visited literally countless other war zones and countries and despite many defining moments (including Rwanda in ’94) none of have defined my world view as much as my time in Afghanistan.

I first deployed to Kandahar in March of 2002 and left for the last time in June of 2012, with dozens of visits in between. I’ve been in every region of the country, met with an unending number of Afghan leaders. But the real impact is the memories of those with whom I served, their sacrifices both the ultimate, and enduring, ones.

Much is made of the failure of close to 20 years and how the boundless optimism by so many leaders was unfounded. It is quite topical to blame Senior Military Leaders at the moment, and although much is fully deserved some of it is misplaced. I can’t help but think that Afghanistan is an example. Did we fail: Yes, but I would argue not in the way that many suggest.  A review of the mission and its morphing is, I think supportive of my view.

When the US led coalition deployed in 2001 (of which a Special Operations Task Force from Canada was an integral part) it was ostensibly to prevent Afghanistan from remaining a Terrorist Safe Haven and operating base for the Al Qaeda. Following 9/11 it must also be admitted that punishment and retribution were an equal part of the equation.  The Taliban’s refusal to meet American demands regarding the protection of the AQ allowed the US to take action. There can be a useful discussion about the basis for such action but I don’t believe that was the actual tipping point. I think it was when the US decided it needed to replace the Taliban Government and charged the CIA with that objective. From there it was a quick step to inserting themselves into the Nation Building agenda, or at least the objectives started to reflect such an agenda despite every effort to avoid such a label.

With the distraction of the Iraq campaign whatever momentum that was created in Afghanistan was lost. Too few resources over too many demands in one too many theatres often spells disaster: history is replete with such examples. But that too, I would argue, was not the military failure.  The military failure was allowing Civilian Western Leadership to continue to get away with thinking there was a military solution to the Afghanistan conundrum.

In this I am strongly biased based on my experiences there. From my very first deployment where our SOTF was involved in Direct Action Operations designed to make Coalition Forces safer from IED Cells and those that would do us harm to my final appointment as the General Officer responsible for the Operations of training the Afghan Army, Policy, Airforce, and Special Operations as well as the provision of advice to the Ministries of Defence and Interior it was clear to me that military operations could never land the victory Wester leaders sought. It was clear to every General Officer who has ever served there as a General Officer. Nothing replaces the experience of that level of deployment for forcing you to address, head on, the harsh realities of working in chaos.

It didn’t matter what training systems we created, bases we built, equipment we bought, advice and assistance on the battlefield we provided. However necessary these activities were they were never going to be sufficient. The sufficient activities would address the systemic corruption at all levels, the lack of an education system that would create future Afghan leaders, let alone the establishment of a viable economy. Nor did we address the all-pervasive ethnic hatred that permeated every conversation with every Afghan Leader I have every spoken to, up to and including the current President.

So what was the failure and what might be the lesson we should strive to learn. The failure was twofold: First that we failed to convince our Political Leaders (because we failed to convince ourselves) that the only path to success should we wish to rebuild a nation was to focus upon those elements that a nation needs to be a stable and functioning state. We are not talking about recreating Canada or Norway but rather a place where the basic elements of human dignity can be enjoyed by every citizen. I can’t recount the number of briefs where the central message to Government Officials was “we are not the solution”  “we can create temporary security and stability but only when we are present”  “unless you address the systemic state wide issues we will merely be mowing the grass” We failed to make that message stick.

Our second failure was the constant optimism and messaging to Canadians. We must learn to be more honest, more direct, with less prevacation on the situation on the ground.  We allowed the pride in the performance of Canadians to be the message. For fear of not having their sacrifices recognized there was a focus on what good they were doing. We failed to add “but it will all be utterly irrelevant, if NATO and its national governments don’t invest, in a serious way, in the type of state wide evolution need to make sustainable change”

So, with those two underlying failures what is the lesson learned. I believe it is this: Western Military Forces, and in particular Combat Forces are really good at certain things. I mean really really good. Don’t believe what those who have never experienced this for themselves. When it comes to actual combat operations there is little that nations such as Canada cannot do. But hard on the heels of such an assertion we must accept, at the beginning not the end of a mission, that there are very few, possibly zero, problems which can be solved by such combat. We can win on the battlefield for however long we decide to fight but until the underlying elements that created the conflict are addressed it will be to no avail. So, in many instances successful combat is necessary to create the conditions to embark on the larger effort and absolutely needed to maintain some level of stability and security until civil society becomes self-sustaining. This caveat must be clear at the beginning and end of every brief to every civilian politician who wishes to deploy a military force in support of a Foreign Policy Objective.

So how should we think about the Afghan Mission. How do we rationalize the terrible cost so many paid and so many continue to pay. Firstly let’s accept Canada had no realistic opportunity to decline to be involved. We did not deploy because we loved Afghans and wanted them to enjoy a better life. We participated because Washington demanded that the world line up in support. “With Us or Against Us” had real meaning. For those who might suggest that this was avoidable I’d suggest they’ve never worked in a Government Policy shop. Having lead the DND International Security Division following my final deployment I have pretty firm views about realpolitik as it is practiced at the most senior of levels. So maybe for self-preservation of my mental wellbeing, or maybe because I want to believe that military service has meaning I think that Canada was right to participate, that the price we paid was for the good of Canada. It will always be too high but it was not meaningless to me.   

The principles of war used to teach that Selection and Maintenance of the Aim is central to any success. We allowed our aim to change without any change to approach and resources. Every man and woman who served in Afghanistan did exactly what we asked them to do. So often they did so brilliantly. We failed them, they did not fail.

Generals and Golfing ...

I felt compelled to once again commit my thoughts to “paper” on where we stand regarding the CAF Issues on SA / SH and the underlying systemic and cultural basis for those challenges.

As always, I think it important, at least at this stage to repeat, repeat and repeat that I recognize and accept that we have a systemic, cultural problem that results in Sexual Assault and Harassment in the CAF. The origins and causes of this are well beyond my expertise to articulate but what is equally clear is that successive generations have inadequately addressed this issue and been ineffective as a result. I am one of those who have failed.  My efforts today in support of various victims is not meant to distinguish myself as being clean of such failure but rather an attempt to help heal what I and others failed to do effectively when given the chance. 

But lately events not from the past but more recently have made the news. The most recent decision by our Acting CDS to have VAdm Baines stay on as Head of our Navy is getting, rightfully so, mixed reviews. I suspect the A/CDS knows there was no “good” decision but rather he tried to choose one, and stage such a decision, that might do the most good.

I am tempted to comment on the Prime Minister’s and his Deputy’s comments but will discipline myself to merely say that I find it inconceivable that the Minister would not have briefed them fully and therefore their public dissension is disingenuous at best. If they truly disagreed, they had the opportunity and authority to make a change necessary before the announcement. Political Opportunism, as ever with elected officials, seems the most likely culprit.

The most recent golf outing has cost one LGen a premature end to his career and forever tarnished a VAdm. I know, admire tremendously and like, both of these Officers.  I was not consulted (nor should I have been) in the decision that LGen Rouleau took to retire early but feel compelled to say a few things on the issue. Regardless of the motivation / compassion that compelled him to play a round a golf with Gen (retd) Vance this was not a good decision. His motivation may have been correct, the expression of such a sentiment was not. For those who think that his motivation is a made up story, well quite frankly I have no time for you: Please stop reading ‘cos I think you are idiots.  Calling LGen Rouleau a liar is to ignore everything he has done in his career. LGen Rouleau is an officer of exceptional ability, who has served his country for decades in the most demanding of appointments. He made a mistake, owned it and is moving on. My most sincere hope is that in balance people see this for what it was and wasn’t. Yes a mistake but uncharacteristic from someone who has served so well for so long. It isn’t illustrative of his over 30 years of service.

In discussing the issue a wise man told me “If I was overly critical of my friends' sins, I would have no friends; not to say I condone the actions of some I consider friends”  I have very few friends. I can hate the sin and love the sinner. I accept that such a stance with regard to Rouleau and Baines might bear a cost in public scrutiny and criticism. I’m pretty comfortable with that. As I have read most recently in an excellent thread by a woman serving in the CAF: “I wanted to take some time to think before speaking” I have thought and this is me speaking.

I was surprised that after LGen Rouleau decided to retire, based on this issue, that he was not recognized for taking responsibility. It was an action consistent with how he has served. Leaders accept responsibility and the accountability that goes with it. But everyone was seemingly too enraptured with the idea of the General’s Cabal playing golf at an Elite Golf Course.  (for the record I am a member there, love golf and Hylands but dear god it is not elite: Less than 5% of the membership are GOFOs and likely less than 50% CAF members…people golf there because it’s the cheapest Golf in Ottawa !!!). I thought this unfair. By all means criticize the decision to play golf with Gen (retd) Vance but if so surely the decision to make oneself publicly accountable is worth commentary as well ?

So, I was not surprised however by the push back on LGen Eyre’s decision to retain VAdm Baines. It seems that “burn it all down” is the only acceptable response to these issues regardless of severity.  I have spoken to countless victims of SA / SH, read everything I can find regarding the commentary on this and other associated issues and can find no where that suggests that a binary solution ie Perfection or Release,  is even remotely a good idea.

I have not yet met a perfect service member, regardless of rank, age, gender, service affiliation etc. In fact I would go further: The best leaders for whom I have worked were flawed, accepted they were flawed and strove continuously to do better. They didn’t hide when they made mistakes, they didn’t make excuses, they accepted their fault and tried to do better. I have known VADm Baines since I put him through his Basic Officer Course in 1987: He made a poor decision, accepted that he had done so and doubtless is now more determined than ever to make the changes necessary.

I’m not trying to make excuses for either of these two Officers. But I do think if we are truly determined to make a difference in our culture, we must accept that we will always be less than perfect. I have served with militaries around the world, many who put in a great deal of effort in appearing to be something they are not. It never holds, imperils operational effectiveness and is quite frankly immoral. I do think there is a continuum of seriousness of offence and individuals should be judged based on where their actions, or inactions, lie along that line. Not everything is excusable but equally not everyone is irredeemable.