Clairvoyance prior to the DPU

 

One Day Alice came to a fork in the road and saw a Cheshire cat in a tree.

“Which road do I take?” she asked.

“Where do you want to go?” was his response.

“I don’t know” Alice answered.

“Then”, said the cat, “it doesn’t matter.”

Alice in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll

 

There is a Defence Policy Update just around the corner and given that I am likely to write about it I thought I would set the conditions so that the disappointment I am likely going to express is only matched by my clairvoyance of the same.  

I should state that I am glad that the Government has decided to complete a review.  I am not a fan of scheduled reviews but do strongly believe that we should hold them regularly. Two conditions should trigger the timing of such efforts. Firstly, when the Security environment has evolved so significantly as to call into question the basic assumptions upon which the previous policy was based; and secondly when the road map that was laid out by that previous policy has run its course.  Both conditions exist, in fact both have existed for well over a year.

But before getting to some evaluation (in a latter post) about the update let me claim it will be inadequate before it hits the street for the simple reason that it is not nested in any larger policy.  We are, quite simply, Alice wandering in a forest: Polite, sort of cute and adorable, sincere in our manner but not really a serious actor of consequence beyond being an example to others of the consequences of listless directionless meanderings.

Defence Policy, when conceived as a concept in and of itself is a directionless beast.  Militaries exist for two purposes: Domestic security (sovereignty, defence, aid to the civilian population etc. with of course relative weighting open to debate, hence the requirement for policy) and as a tangible expression and lever to be used in support of a Foreign Policy which itself is designed to serve Canadians both directly and indirectly. Lacking any expression of either Security or Foreign Policy, it is nigh on impossible to determine why our military is doing what it is doing. This is no criticism of those who serve in uniform, for whom I have an obvious biased affection and deep regard but rather to point out that once again we prove we are not a serious nation. Perhaps more accurately we remain a nation that actually seems to want to avoid saying what principles we value, prioritize accordingly and then move to supporting those through clearly expressed objectives and appropriately assigned resources. We want to claim all values, or more accurately any value at any time if it is political expedient to do so. So we will revert to the traditional claims of having a policy based on some variation of Protect Canadians at Home, Contribution to North American Defence, and some weaselly words about bringing peace, security, and prosperity to the global commons.  Good policy needs more than just claiming every action is in Canada’s interests. Not defining those interests reveals such statements for what they are: intellectual pablum.

So why should such a lack bother us. There are many reasons, but let’s choose three relatively simple examples of what results from such a groundless starting point.

Firstly, our Army, Navy and Airforce are fundamentally composed and structured in an identical way as they were in the 1960s, 1970s etc etc.  Yes, the equipment is slightly more modern, and yes we have added some additional capabilities but even the most cursory examination of what is going on might suggest that we rethink a 50 year old + model. Now there might be good reasons for this. Government might believe that such consistency serves our Nation’s interest both domestically and internationally but for a country with such a small military one would think that a more strategic lens would better suit both purposes.  Time has moved on quite significantly, the CAF less so.  

Secondly despite any misplaced belief to the contrary we are still unable to operate in the vast majority of Canada. We simply cannot deploy let alone sustain a force of any size to any remote part of Canada. Why is this important do you ask? Sovereignty is maintained when you have awareness and presence leading to an ability to claim those lands and waters, as a nation, are yours.  The internal waterways of our north throughout the Arctic Archipelago are claimed by Canada to be sovereign. Of course, this faces the slight challenge that the vast majority of other nations, including ALL nations with a presence in the Artic (as well as China) don’t agree.  We protest vociferously and no doubt many stern letters have been written. Those letters have been written in replacement of actually being able to do something. I am not claiming that we should reorient the complete CAF to become Arctic survivalists but merely pointing out that we are absent in both a Security and Foreign Policy that address how we consider our land and water and how we plan to interact with those who flagrantly ignore our virtue signaling claims. For example, how might we respond to China’s rapidly growing Ice Breaking Fleet? Presumably, China being a nation without any ice bound ports is likely going to search for a way to use the capability on which they have spent so much money. They might have conceived of such a use before committing to such a fleet. Additionally, and historically, we have leaned hard on the US for support in continental defence matters. In this case, given the US also does not recognize our claims, such an approach might prove to be problematic. This is, indeed, one of the unforeseen consequences of farming much of your defence to a neighbor.

The third example that results in lieu of having direct, i.e., Security and Foreign Policy, goals that drive the Defence Policy is that because of our directionless meanderings we have classically resorted to maintaining a General Combat Capability which essentially means we are trying to do a little bit of everything all the time. It is the only recourse when successive governments want to have options available to them but don’t want to make the harder decisions before that point in time.  Our commitment to Ukraine illustrates this point: Having donated 8 Tanks to Ukraine, we have now decided to commit a 15 Tank Squadron to the forward deployed Canadian Led NATO Battle Group in Latvia. A lot can be said about those decisions, much of it good, albeit they presumably result from an ad hoc decision given we don’t know what Foreign Policy drove that decision cycle. I digress.  The impact of those two decisions is that we now have committed the entire Tank Fleet of the Canadian Army.  As a general rule the CAF runs on a rough calculation of having a 5 to 1 ratio in order to force generate and sustain an international deployment. Before thinking that sounds off, translate that to being on a deployment every 32 months. With work up training (individual and collective), the actual deployment, post deployment reconstitution, etc that means that every CAF serving member that is involved in our Tank corps is committed. Now for a career NCM who might spend their first 20 years in a Regiment that means approx 6- 7 deployments before they are 40 ! For the sake of a 15 Tank deployment. Now this isn’t a plea for more tanks (I think we should be out of that business) but rather an attempt to highlight that in addition to the cost borne by our soldiers, a secondary consequence is that the overall construct of the Army’s General Combat Capability falls apart as it no longer has available the necessary armoured element.  We now have a broken model for the provision of a general combat capability based on a decision that is not underpinned by either a Foreign or Security Policy objective and is, quite frankly, a modest contribution at that.

When the current government announced Strong Secure and Engaged (SSE the current policy), they preceded it with a Foreign Policy speech in the house by then Minister Freeland.  No debate, no engagement, merely a speech. We can argue about the quality, scope and viability of that speech but what seems clear is that at best it was a last-minute attempt to provide a chapeau to SSE which was released the next day. This is not the stuff of serious thinkers no matter how sincere we are in the articulation of such things.

So, once again we can anticipate a flurry of speeches just before the release of the DPU. For any who watch the current Global Affairs Canada public engagement it is impossible to mistake this for serious work.  This government has rightfully earned a reputation for their overly earnest, solemn language, and thoughtful expression when talking in public and then conveniently moving onto the next opportunity to do the same.  A Foreign and a Security Policy are much needed elements to integrate all parts of Government in the achievement of common goals.  To quote the Chinse curse (which somehow seems appropriate) “We live in interesting times” but such times need serious thought, debate and public commitment by elected officials as to what they value, how that translates into specific objectives that serve the people of Canada and how we will achieve those objectives. A defence policy is part of that last piece, it should neither lead nor define itself sadly defence for the sake of defence seems to be the way.  Prime Minister Mackenzie King was famous for adopting a policy of “don’t let your left hand know what your right hand is doing” and was rightfully pilloried by the poet FR Scott who labelled Mackenzie as doing “nothing by halves, which could be done by quarters.”  For Foreign and Security policy let alone Defence Policy that has been the state of play for generations of Canadian Governments. 

Lessons Learned: Avoiding the Trading of False Tactical Victory at the Expense of Strategic Defeat

 

The learning of lessons (LL)  is a challenging process for any institution. That is especially true for those inherently hierarchical organizations which have to accept that a real examination of success and failure will inevitably accrue both of those outcomes to its leadership.  We can use careful language and weight observations but in the end the success or failure of operations is invariably a consequence of the Command, Management and Leadership of those entrusted with positions of authority. 

However difficult it is to conduct these processes that difficulty pales in comparison to its importance. A “Relentless Pursuit of Excellence” (to borrow a value from my alma mater) requires an unflinching self-appraisal.  This can only be achieved if predilections, which are really ground-in biases, are recognized from the outset.  Failure to do so allows for confirmation bias and willful ignorance. Neither perspective is value added.

So when it comes to the current events in Ottawa, those surrounding the “Truckers’ Freedom Convoy,” it’s probably important that I admit my self-recognized biases. First and last, I’m a bit of a Rule of Law guy. By that I mean I think that democratic based Civil Society is best served by broad acceptance and adherence to the basic laws of the country as determined by elected officials.  Secondly, I accept that those laws will not be met with broad consensus in all corners but that those who disagree have the opportunity to vote those law makers out. Should they be sufficiently successful in arguing for an alternative view new law makers will be elected and laws will be changed.  Lastly, I very strongly believe that lawlessness is a slippery slope and conscious decisions to “not” hold law breakers to account set dangerous precedents that are merely amplified as time progress and consequentially laws become de facto if not de jure more difficult to enforce. I have visited, deployed to, worked in (not quite countless but a sufficiently large number of) countries that are essentially lawless. There is nothing about these countries I admire. They are not free, the population has few if any real rights. Without exception Canada has been and remains the “Free-est” country I have ever experienced.  Do I agree, with let alone like, the too often feckless political figures that operate on populism and opportunity: not in the least. But, I do love the fact that we Canadians elected them, and generally we elect them based on a reasonably clear understanding of what they will do and not do. (And yes I admit there are always more promises than actions but in a general sense given that we also know that to be true we can’t subsequently claim surprise)

It might be worth noting that although I have no access to classified material my close connections to the Security and Intelligence communities on both sides of the border leave me absolutely ZERO DOUBT about how those few “truckers” that are present have been coopted for more nefarious ends by truly corrupt and immoral actors. I suspect the vast majority of actual truckers are just frustrated, mad and upset. But the fact that they have been “used” by others does not now excuse their lawlessness. If I “know” this,  imagine what those with classified material see and know.

But, and I hope this argument proves my point. Whether you agree or disagree with my own biases the possibility that tactical victory can lead to strategic failure remains ever present.  That is the dynamic in which we currently operate. The window to fix this is short and finite.

Let me add an additional bias / opinion: The management of the “Freedom Convoy” by officials at all levels has been nothing short than complete and utter failure. Attribute blame where you will but I would suggest that failure at the beginning to be a stronger, more present, more active presence provided a tactical victory to the criminal occupation and a tactical failure to city officials. I do not buy, for a moment, that we should have defined victory as merely the absence of “no riots, no injuries, no deaths” I can think of no instance where appeasement of a bully resulted in a win. No proper analysis of the situation in advance, during or immediately following the first weekend could have possibly suggested that this was the standard.

 Imagine

Boss: “We are going to do nothing to disrupt the unlawful activity”

Question: “But won’t this make it more difficult to resolve later on when they get fixed in place ?”

Boss  “Yes, but we can claim we won today”

Question  “Even if it ultimately encourages further criminal actions ? ”

Boss “Yes but we can claim we won today”

The standard should have been, should be and should remain: Have the actions of those in positions in Authority contributed to the long-term stability and security of Canada and its citizens with the least possible price to pay in the immediate short term.

What I mean by this is that by allowing the protestors to congregate and essentially bully and intimidate the OPS into inaction they have established a precedent that is dangerous to everyone, everywhere.  

Both sides get to learn lessons. The protestor’s single greatest lesson learned is that if they are able to mass a sufficiently sized crowd that makes threatening statements, sprinkled with extremists of all types then they will be allowed to continue unabated. Observation of previous protests suggests that not amassing such a mob makes them vulnerable.  Like many I do wonder if the same such tolerance would have been extended to Canadian Muslims or BIPOCs.

So what we have experienced is a tactical failure to prevent or subsequently manage the event, cloaked as tactical success under a misinformed definition of “victory” at the cost of strategic failure.  Ottawa, and indeed Canada writ large has demonstrated that it is vulnerable to a repeat performance. By trading a pyrrhic victory, we avoided (admittedly) hard decisions and actions but have lost considerably in the larger and longer context. Bullies and Cowards exploit weakness. I have seen this around the world, in all its ugly shapes and forms. The requirement for elected officials to capitulate to “demands”, the defending of breaking of the law (but insisting that others adhere to laws they favour) and of course valuing only their freedom but not recognizing the rights of others. (I wonder how many thousands of minimum wage workers in the Rideau Mall, in the midst of a pandemic pushed are into a state of poverty that will take months from which to recover ??).  We have also demonstrated that Hate Mongers are free to walk around and spew their vile nonsense. We have provided a stage and the media has obliged by showcasing them in a perverse attempt to be balanced and fair.

But all is not lost. Fortunately, other Canadian cities and their executive authorities were watching closely and acted appropriately. That is another lesson: Learn from the mistakes of others.  Ottawa can still extract itself from this debacle and change the “take away.” Immediate action before, during and after next weekend.  This starts with politicians passing emergency legislation to empower Law Enforcement Agencies. It continues with law enforcement agencies understanding that tough slogging today makes future events safer and easier for them. I do not pretend these decisions are easy, but that is why we select senior commanders ie to do senior commander like things. Commanders are always going to be unpopular. Striving for popularity merely results in a double failure as invariably you can’t make everyone happy and yet subordinate your responsibilities in an attempt to do so. That’s another lesson. Making people ‘happy” only for today invariably makes them unhappy in the longer term. Everyone can “manage” when there are policy or budget discussions, what is needed now is leadership and command decisions.

It all starts with an understanding of what is the objective and that isn’t a temporary PR victory that can easily be won avoiding taking any action. It is by holding people to account for their criminal acts. I love that Canadians can protest. Their rights to do so vigorously, loudly and as often as they wish must not just be protected but must be championed. I also admit to thinking that many, certainly not all and likely a minority, of the complainants are showing more fragility than I admire. But ultimately and always I land on the side of adherence to the Rule of Law. Enjoying the freedom to protest comes with the obligation of being law abiding.

We still have time to do better, to avoid the strategic failure that would result in a multiple repeats and worsening scenarios of what we experience now.   Learning is hard, but necessary. Time to do some hard things.

"I wouldn't start from here"

 I read a tremendously thoughtful tweet thread from Annalise Schamuhn yesterday which reminded me that the ability to hold two ( or more) seemingly conflicting ideas is absolutely necessary when dealing with complex issues. 

At the moment

Lt(N) MacDonald considers herself to be the victim of an Assault

Adm McDonald considers himself to be innocent of the alleged crime

There was insufficient evidence based on both the testimony and (in some cases) a refusal to testify to lay charges,   

Where does that leave us. The two opposing thoughts are to support and believe the alleged victim and ensure that due process is followed with the presumption of innocence. I do not think these to be incompatible.

Like so many serving, retired CAF members and interested civilians I have watched with, quite frankly, horror the events surrounding Adm Art MacDonald’s situation concerning his appointment. For those currently serving to comment would be entirely inappropriate. In fact to do otherwise would contravene legal restrictions. For others I think the time to speak is now.

When serving I had known the Admiral, albeit not well, for a number of years. He was always very competent, tremendously amiable and dedicated. I liked him. I suspect if we were to renew our acquaintance in other circumstances, I would like him equally well. He is a likeable individual.

None of that is germane to the fact that he is not suitable to be our CDS.

Upon reading his letter to his GOFOs I am struck by three things. The start point, the adopted strategy, and the focus of his words. Each reminds me of an aphorism. The first when down home and when asking for directions it is not uncommon to hear in reply “Well I wouldn’t start from here” the second when talking about young Army Officers’ first forays on Field Exercises “Lost but making good time” and lastly “leadership demands personal subordination and sacrifice to the greater good.”

Contrary to the Admiral’s claim and the start point of his argument, a failure to press charges, for whatever reason is not an exoneration, neither in form nor function. A decision not to proceed based on insufficient evidence neither exonerates nor condemns. Exoneration can only come from those who govern the Admiral ( ie MND / PM). They, in order to achieve such an effect, would have to publicly state “We have reviewed all available details and have determined that Admiral MacDonald is cleared of suspicion and as a result we consider him free of any taint and as such enjoys our complete confidence in his ability to Command the CAF.” Notwithstanding the election the GoC has had sufficient time to come to that conclusion and make such a proclamation. That they have not done so informs (or should inform) the Admiral’s start point.

Despite claiming an exoneration that does not exist it is important to note this such a claim is also besides the point. The CDS serves at the pleasure of the GOC, all Order in Council appointments do. The only issue is “Does Admiral McDonald enjoy the confidence of the elected Government.” A lack of being charged is a far step from crossing that bar.  

His chosen path is equally concerning. Public statements about his intention to return to his appointment, followed by a letter to the CAF GOFOs indicates one of two things. Either he truly does not understand how Orders in Council and the machinery of government actually work or that the intent behind such actions is not targeting his return but rather any negotiations that might inform his release.  If the first instance such ignorance is disqualifying. In the second there is a demonstration of a willingness to ignore the impact on Lt(N) MacDonald as well as to continue to negatively impact the morale of the CAF for personal gain: This too is disqualifying.

Lastly, the irony in holding a leadership appointment is that one must always be willing to lose such a position in order to deserve it.  This is often portrayed in the language used to communicate. Even the most cursory reading of the Admiral’s letter reveals a focus almost entirely on his status as opposed to the system and the indviduals who make up the CAF.  It has been noted elsewhere but the contrast between his letter and LGen Cadieu’s note is stark.

It is inescapable that fundamental cultural and systemic change is needed by the CAF. Many academics, politicians and casual observers offer up the solutions to these problems. Some are informed and unbiased, most considerably less so. Contrary to what they might demand in their own fields few are willing to turn to analysis based an examination of facts but rather seem to follow the populism of immediate commentary so common in today’s “fast fashion-esque” dissemination and consumption of “news.” But regardless of the larger issues what should be clear is that Admiral MacDonald has not helped argue his case. He has started in the wrong place thereafter moved in the wrong direction and used language that centered the issue on himself. A CDS might reasonably be expected to be more thoughtful, more capable and less self-serving.

My final thoughts in this instance are with Lt(N) MacDonald. I have no legal education that would allow me to make an informed judgement on the decisions made regarding the allegations, investigation etc (btw very very few of those expressing opinions on those details actually do !!) but I do know that she should have reasonably expected better treatment from a leader who claimed exoneration. When we say “this hurts the system” what we are also saying is that “we are hurting individuals in the system.” Her hurt has been perpetuated not healed.  That by itself is a condemnation. 

It is of little comfort, but I do believe that the revealing of these deep cultural and systemic ills are necessary to be better. The overwhelming majority of CAF members, at all levels, are not just good but are great representatives of Canada and its values. I don’t rejoice about our current circumstance, nobody could, but I take comfort that it is being revealed and will therefore be addressed. We don’t get to decide our start point, we are not lost ( ie we know the issue !!! ) but neither are we yet making good time. I have confidence we will. The path will neither be smooth let alone uninterrupted but neither should our stumbles along the way be misconstrued as failure.  

Leaving Afghanistan: Another Thought

 Having previously written about the the American decision to leave Afghanistan and what that might functionally mean today I am faced, as we all are, with the reality on the ground.

Having re read my previous Blog I find no compulsion to "correct" or edit those previous thoughts but I do think they are incomplete in capturing some aspect of Canada's involvement.  I finished that Blog with commentary about how Selection and Maintenance of the Aim was so important for any Canadian involvement in deployed operations. It has been so so easy to get distracted from our Strategic Objectives by the "pressing need on the ground"   That pressing need has, over years turned into a "demand signal" which of course is to help those who helped us. 

Admittedly I was previously against bringing back those Afghan interpreters and support staff to Canada. This was years ago.  When there was still a chance that Afghanistan might find its way to some sort of stable Civil Society it was very clear that those who helped us over the years were going to be the very sort of people needed the most. Diluting an already pitifully small number of reasonably educated Afghans was not going to help, in fact it guaranteed things would be more difficult. However as the Senior Afghan Leadership continued to demonstrate their traditional self serving focus at the expense of making any real change, and as the world grew tired of waiting ( and unwilling to help) it was increasingly clear that there was going to be no significant change. The moment the Americans announced their pull out, was the moment of the Taliban's victory and the moment I changed my view about bringing to Canada those who will now no longer be the backbone of transforming Afghanistan but rather be the victims of a refreshed / renewed Taliban regime. 

Afghans have proven over the course of history that their leadership is adroit at adapting to reality and doing their very best to profit from whatever circumstances they may face. Again, having dealt with a countless number of those individuals I have an unshakeable belief in their ability to spout whatever ideology might keep them not just alive but enriched and in positions of power.  Prior to the American announcement it was democracy and human rights, today it is the God given right for the Taliban to rule under the most harsh interpretation of Sharia Law.  Anyone who thinks that the Taliban have changed their spots has never seen a leopard. Because we want something to be true does not make it so. And when it comes to an evolved Taliban it most certainly is a fantasy of those who are either remarkably poorly informed or just simply lie to themselves and others. 

So, all that being said we should evacuate those that helped us. But we do so for more than humanitarian grounds, more than a moral obligation.  We must do so because, however unpopular it is to say, it is good for Canada and its attainment of future Strategic Objectives.  

Quickly reviewing our involvement in Afghanistan would reveal that we didn't go there because we loved democracy nor that we wanted to free Afghans from the yoke of Taliban rule. We went there because the US decided that if you weren't in support of them you were against them.  We participated for close to 14 years as the cost of not doing so, through the eyes of Washington and Ottawa, would be unacceptable. We didn't say that but it is the harsh reality. Claiming we were all about girls, schools and love of peace and freedom just simply isn't true. It's what our people did oh so well tactically but it was not the strategic objective. If it was we would have pushed to focus on Civil Society after the initial years of combat. We didn't because that's not what the US wanted. 

Looking forward and although we may hope that the US will learn from the past 20 years in Afghanistan, Iraq etc their past behaviour should give us little reason to actually hope. Regardless Hope is Not a Method. So, at some future juncture the US will once again flex and occupy a third world country and Canada will once again be called upon to help bring democracy to the world and support the poor and suffering peoples of country X.  That's not why we will go but go we will go nonetheless. 

When we do go, we will rely on the locals for more support than is possibly imaginable back here in Canada. Since the end of the Cold War and wherever we have deployed we have leaned on local communities to support the deployment. Lots of reasons why, most of them very good. But in order to do so those locals not only benefit but put themselves in harm's way should we decided to abandon the effort and leave them labelled as traitors to whichever self serving War Lord assumes control.  The CAF will need to hire locals and will in turn need to be able to point to previous efforts that when the West gets tired of doing the wrong thing over 20 years and pulls out that they will be protected and offered sanctuary. What we do now, how we handle this crisis will echo in our future. The safety of well being of deployed CAF pers requires nothing less. 

So yes there is absolutely a moral imperative to help those who helped us. Such an imperative also helps avoid further moral injuries to those who have served there and feel strongly about those who helped saved CAF lives. But there is also an Operational Imperative which is about setting the conditions for the future. 

Although American is no longer the dominant country it was, and is doubtlessly self imploding, its foreign interventions will dictate much of what Canadian Governments do and don't do with regard to military deployments for years to come.  So if morality dictates we exhaust every effort to support those who supported us then the future safety and capability of the CAF underline such an effort. It's not only good today but it's good for the future. 

Woke, Weakness and The Warrior Spirit

 

It has become fashionable in Academia and the Media to demonize that term “Warrior.”  Based on how they use it and the connotations they apply consequently I fully understand and endorse such condemnation. I, however, do not associated the word “Warrior” with the trappings they apply and so will continue to consider it as the best expression possible that captures my thoughts on what it means to be a member of the Profession of Arms.

One of the things that my own journey in higher education is teaching me is that choosing those ideas that appeal to one and rejecting those that don’t is very much at the heart of the intellectual debate. I don’t mean to suggest that it isn’t done with thought and rigorous analysis but rather to reflect that such contentions are core to improving the actual discussion. So, I choose to adopt the ideas of the Warrior Spirit as used for so long by the late Dr Bill Bentley.  A champion of Clausewitz and Design Thinking, Bill would often tell me when we worked together that the needed component to be successful in the Profession of Arms was a Warrior’s Spirit. He described this has having the Physical, Mental, Spiritual and Emotional elements necessary to engage in the fight. He understood, much earlier than I did, how this was an equation of multiplication vice addition. Meaning if just one of those elements had zero value, then the output was automatically zero. Each was necessary, none were capable of offsetting a shortfall of another let along being sufficient on their own.

I think about this and Bill’s thoughts, a lot. Pretty much everyday.

I’m also aware that the quality of the public dialogue has been cheapened by a number of major elements including but likely not restricted to the advent of Social Media, the evolution of Main Stream Media, as well as the increased populism of both Left and Right aligned Politicians. I am sure that there is more that has diminished this conversation but itemizing these is sufficient to demonstrate my point. The privileging of ideas in Academia is excusable when supported by deep thought, analysis and substantiated by evidence. The evidentiary cherry picking by individuals who lack all of those redeeming features should be seen as an anathema, rather than the gospel so many consider it to be.  

I, like so many, watched the 6^th January attack on Capital Hill with horror. Not because of the violence, which to many was shocking but to most military pers with deployed experience would not be so jarring as an actual activity. What was jarring was that it could happen in a Western Democracy and quite frankly one just south of our border.  But if that event was unsettling, the follow-on debate, including the attacking of serving members for being “Woke” when daring to speak critically of those moments has been, for me at least, even more worrisome.

Ultimately, I have interpreted that criticism as being essentially: “If you care to inform yourself, if you are determined to care for others regardless of their circumstance then you are Woke and that is weak and that diminishes our military capability.”  Applying my view of the Warrior Spirit the exact opposite is true. If you are not constantly trying to improve your understanding of the operating environment, informed by deep and comprehensive study and if you have no compassion for your fellow human beings then you are failing on every element that is essential to success.

This is not to say that I don’t have concerns about the readiness of our military nor that they are being gradually weakened.  For those with whom I have worked you will fully anticipate this: We are increasingly fat and lazy as a military force. I have always believed that there is a direct cost to this now systemic challenge. I wrote an additional number of paragraphs on this but having re read them realized they were a distraction from my main point which is if being Woke is being better informed and caring more, than it contributes to vice takes away from our Warrior Spirit. I can’t help but add this is not a generational issue as the young women and men joining are neither less or more fit than previous but rather those in their 30s, 40s and 50s who have simply just stopped trying to be deployably fit. ..but I digress.

Obviously, given my background, I am more than comfortable with the application of violence, or the threat thereof, to achieve a policy objective. Many people don’t like that idea. In fact, most assiduously avoid such direct language. But such avoidance has no bearing on the actual reality of why we have a military force. Yes the CAF can fill sand bags, it can help in LTC homes and it can do many of those things well when needed. Indeed, it should. But that is not our raison d’etre.  A nation’s military is designed with purpose and focus: To fight. The word “Warrior” seems far too aggressive for some. Those are invariably in two groups: There are those who do not believe in military force regardless of circumstance. I admire these people (whilst thinking them utterly naïve) and remain grateful for their voices. The other group just want to avoid thinking about the things they might agree are necessary but would prefer to use language that doesn’t force them to think about the reality of conflict and what it means. I reserve all of my disdain for such individuals.

The reality is that the world is becoming more not less chaotic. The fight of our lifetime, that of climate change, will indisputably make regional conflict more not less common. It will make those conflicts harder to fight in every single way. Do we need to be fitter to be ready to engage in those conflicts, absolutely, but equally inarguably and additionally we need to actually be “more Woke.” To prepare our team to fight effectively we must inculcate a Warrior’s Spirit described by whatever language you wish to adopt. Being Woke, adds to, does not diminish the Warrior.  

Leaving Afghanistan

 

Like so many Afghan Vets the formalization of the departure of the US from Afghanistan conjures up all sorts of reactions. For so many of us, for so long it has defined much of our military service.  Younger members will have other theaters but for many in their 40s – early 70s (yes..we have Afghan Vets now turning 70 +) Afghan was a defining deployment.  I’ve deployed to the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, visited literally countless other war zones and countries and despite many defining moments (including Rwanda in ’94) none of have defined my world view as much as my time in Afghanistan.

I first deployed to Kandahar in March of 2002 and left for the last time in June of 2012, with dozens of visits in between. I’ve been in every region of the country, met with an unending number of Afghan leaders. But the real impact is the memories of those with whom I served, their sacrifices both the ultimate, and enduring, ones.

Much is made of the failure of close to 20 years and how the boundless optimism by so many leaders was unfounded. It is quite topical to blame Senior Military Leaders at the moment, and although much is fully deserved some of it is misplaced. I can’t help but think that Afghanistan is an example. Did we fail: Yes, but I would argue not in the way that many suggest.  A review of the mission and its morphing is, I think supportive of my view.

When the US led coalition deployed in 2001 (of which a Special Operations Task Force from Canada was an integral part) it was ostensibly to prevent Afghanistan from remaining a Terrorist Safe Haven and operating base for the Al Qaeda. Following 9/11 it must also be admitted that punishment and retribution were an equal part of the equation.  The Taliban’s refusal to meet American demands regarding the protection of the AQ allowed the US to take action. There can be a useful discussion about the basis for such action but I don’t believe that was the actual tipping point. I think it was when the US decided it needed to replace the Taliban Government and charged the CIA with that objective. From there it was a quick step to inserting themselves into the Nation Building agenda, or at least the objectives started to reflect such an agenda despite every effort to avoid such a label.

With the distraction of the Iraq campaign whatever momentum that was created in Afghanistan was lost. Too few resources over too many demands in one too many theatres often spells disaster: history is replete with such examples. But that too, I would argue, was not the military failure.  The military failure was allowing Civilian Western Leadership to continue to get away with thinking there was a military solution to the Afghanistan conundrum.

In this I am strongly biased based on my experiences there. From my very first deployment where our SOTF was involved in Direct Action Operations designed to make Coalition Forces safer from IED Cells and those that would do us harm to my final appointment as the General Officer responsible for the Operations of training the Afghan Army, Policy, Airforce, and Special Operations as well as the provision of advice to the Ministries of Defence and Interior it was clear to me that military operations could never land the victory Wester leaders sought. It was clear to every General Officer who has ever served there as a General Officer. Nothing replaces the experience of that level of deployment for forcing you to address, head on, the harsh realities of working in chaos.

It didn’t matter what training systems we created, bases we built, equipment we bought, advice and assistance on the battlefield we provided. However necessary these activities were they were never going to be sufficient. The sufficient activities would address the systemic corruption at all levels, the lack of an education system that would create future Afghan leaders, let alone the establishment of a viable economy. Nor did we address the all-pervasive ethnic hatred that permeated every conversation with every Afghan Leader I have every spoken to, up to and including the current President.

So what was the failure and what might be the lesson we should strive to learn. The failure was twofold: First that we failed to convince our Political Leaders (because we failed to convince ourselves) that the only path to success should we wish to rebuild a nation was to focus upon those elements that a nation needs to be a stable and functioning state. We are not talking about recreating Canada or Norway but rather a place where the basic elements of human dignity can be enjoyed by every citizen. I can’t recount the number of briefs where the central message to Government Officials was “we are not the solution”  “we can create temporary security and stability but only when we are present”  “unless you address the systemic state wide issues we will merely be mowing the grass” We failed to make that message stick.

Our second failure was the constant optimism and messaging to Canadians. We must learn to be more honest, more direct, with less prevacation on the situation on the ground.  We allowed the pride in the performance of Canadians to be the message. For fear of not having their sacrifices recognized there was a focus on what good they were doing. We failed to add “but it will all be utterly irrelevant, if NATO and its national governments don’t invest, in a serious way, in the type of state wide evolution need to make sustainable change”

So, with those two underlying failures what is the lesson learned. I believe it is this: Western Military Forces, and in particular Combat Forces are really good at certain things. I mean really really good. Don’t believe what those who have never experienced this for themselves. When it comes to actual combat operations there is little that nations such as Canada cannot do. But hard on the heels of such an assertion we must accept, at the beginning not the end of a mission, that there are very few, possibly zero, problems which can be solved by such combat. We can win on the battlefield for however long we decide to fight but until the underlying elements that created the conflict are addressed it will be to no avail. So, in many instances successful combat is necessary to create the conditions to embark on the larger effort and absolutely needed to maintain some level of stability and security until civil society becomes self-sustaining. This caveat must be clear at the beginning and end of every brief to every civilian politician who wishes to deploy a military force in support of a Foreign Policy Objective.

So how should we think about the Afghan Mission. How do we rationalize the terrible cost so many paid and so many continue to pay. Firstly let’s accept Canada had no realistic opportunity to decline to be involved. We did not deploy because we loved Afghans and wanted them to enjoy a better life. We participated because Washington demanded that the world line up in support. “With Us or Against Us” had real meaning. For those who might suggest that this was avoidable I’d suggest they’ve never worked in a Government Policy shop. Having lead the DND International Security Division following my final deployment I have pretty firm views about realpolitik as it is practiced at the most senior of levels. So maybe for self-preservation of my mental wellbeing, or maybe because I want to believe that military service has meaning I think that Canada was right to participate, that the price we paid was for the good of Canada. It will always be too high but it was not meaningless to me.   

The principles of war used to teach that Selection and Maintenance of the Aim is central to any success. We allowed our aim to change without any change to approach and resources. Every man and woman who served in Afghanistan did exactly what we asked them to do. So often they did so brilliantly. We failed them, they did not fail.

Generals and Golfing ...

I felt compelled to once again commit my thoughts to “paper” on where we stand regarding the CAF Issues on SA / SH and the underlying systemic and cultural basis for those challenges.

As always, I think it important, at least at this stage to repeat, repeat and repeat that I recognize and accept that we have a systemic, cultural problem that results in Sexual Assault and Harassment in the CAF. The origins and causes of this are well beyond my expertise to articulate but what is equally clear is that successive generations have inadequately addressed this issue and been ineffective as a result. I am one of those who have failed.  My efforts today in support of various victims is not meant to distinguish myself as being clean of such failure but rather an attempt to help heal what I and others failed to do effectively when given the chance. 

But lately events not from the past but more recently have made the news. The most recent decision by our Acting CDS to have VAdm Baines stay on as Head of our Navy is getting, rightfully so, mixed reviews. I suspect the A/CDS knows there was no “good” decision but rather he tried to choose one, and stage such a decision, that might do the most good.

I am tempted to comment on the Prime Minister’s and his Deputy’s comments but will discipline myself to merely say that I find it inconceivable that the Minister would not have briefed them fully and therefore their public dissension is disingenuous at best. If they truly disagreed, they had the opportunity and authority to make a change necessary before the announcement. Political Opportunism, as ever with elected officials, seems the most likely culprit.

The most recent golf outing has cost one LGen a premature end to his career and forever tarnished a VAdm. I know, admire tremendously and like, both of these Officers.  I was not consulted (nor should I have been) in the decision that LGen Rouleau took to retire early but feel compelled to say a few things on the issue. Regardless of the motivation / compassion that compelled him to play a round a golf with Gen (retd) Vance this was not a good decision. His motivation may have been correct, the expression of such a sentiment was not. For those who think that his motivation is a made up story, well quite frankly I have no time for you: Please stop reading ‘cos I think you are idiots.  Calling LGen Rouleau a liar is to ignore everything he has done in his career. LGen Rouleau is an officer of exceptional ability, who has served his country for decades in the most demanding of appointments. He made a mistake, owned it and is moving on. My most sincere hope is that in balance people see this for what it was and wasn’t. Yes a mistake but uncharacteristic from someone who has served so well for so long. It isn’t illustrative of his over 30 years of service.

In discussing the issue a wise man told me “If I was overly critical of my friends' sins, I would have no friends; not to say I condone the actions of some I consider friends”  I have very few friends. I can hate the sin and love the sinner. I accept that such a stance with regard to Rouleau and Baines might bear a cost in public scrutiny and criticism. I’m pretty comfortable with that. As I have read most recently in an excellent thread by a woman serving in the CAF: “I wanted to take some time to think before speaking” I have thought and this is me speaking.

I was surprised that after LGen Rouleau decided to retire, based on this issue, that he was not recognized for taking responsibility. It was an action consistent with how he has served. Leaders accept responsibility and the accountability that goes with it. But everyone was seemingly too enraptured with the idea of the General’s Cabal playing golf at an Elite Golf Course.  (for the record I am a member there, love golf and Hylands but dear god it is not elite: Less than 5% of the membership are GOFOs and likely less than 50% CAF members…people golf there because it’s the cheapest Golf in Ottawa !!!). I thought this unfair. By all means criticize the decision to play golf with Gen (retd) Vance but if so surely the decision to make oneself publicly accountable is worth commentary as well ?

So, I was not surprised however by the push back on LGen Eyre’s decision to retain VAdm Baines. It seems that “burn it all down” is the only acceptable response to these issues regardless of severity.  I have spoken to countless victims of SA / SH, read everything I can find regarding the commentary on this and other associated issues and can find no where that suggests that a binary solution ie Perfection or Release,  is even remotely a good idea.

I have not yet met a perfect service member, regardless of rank, age, gender, service affiliation etc. In fact I would go further: The best leaders for whom I have worked were flawed, accepted they were flawed and strove continuously to do better. They didn’t hide when they made mistakes, they didn’t make excuses, they accepted their fault and tried to do better. I have known VADm Baines since I put him through his Basic Officer Course in 1987: He made a poor decision, accepted that he had done so and doubtless is now more determined than ever to make the changes necessary.

I’m not trying to make excuses for either of these two Officers. But I do think if we are truly determined to make a difference in our culture, we must accept that we will always be less than perfect. I have served with militaries around the world, many who put in a great deal of effort in appearing to be something they are not. It never holds, imperils operational effectiveness and is quite frankly immoral. I do think there is a continuum of seriousness of offence and individuals should be judged based on where their actions, or inactions, lie along that line. Not everything is excusable but equally not everyone is irredeemable.