Further Thoughts on the SA / SH issues facing the CAF

 I am finding that the only way I can make sense of what is happening in the CAF, as a result of great reporting, is to write it all down, try to edit and see if it captures a coherent view. I suspect I will edit this a number of times and I’ll be interested to review what I am posting today, and what I think of it in 2 weeks, 2 months or indeed 2 years from now. Much like the science of COVID I suspect as new facts emerge, I will continue to refine both what I think and how I express those thoughts. In fact, I hope that is true as that would be a mature approach. (more on that later..and how being pigeon holed on a fixed position is …well … ridiculous)

To start with I must say that however upsetting I don’t resent a single element all of the reporting that is coming out. If you assume (as we all must) that the issue is rife throughout the CAF  ( this is not a Senior Officer issue, although such examples best exemplify the issue) then until it gained the level of public exposure it currently “enjoys” nothing was going to change.

At this stage I am forced to repeat what every white male of my generation of leaders should be forced to repeat: We failed. 

We failed for many many reasons but including out individual and collective actions as well as a failure to force the change so desperately needed. There will be attempts to explain why, and indeed there are reasons why.  There are no excuses however and the difference in language between reasons and excuses is more than merely a nuance. There will also be efforts to dilute the focus and create solutions that deal with larger cultural challenges. I don’t dispute that larger cultural challenges are being faced but the effort to widen the scope will result in a missed opportunity and almost invariably as a result a perpetuation of a slow and inadequate response. I fear it will be used by some to divert and distract.

Whatever the CAF / DND decides to do and whatever the GOC decides to force upon them (and there will absolutely be elements of both) the reality is that the issue is so clearly all pervasive that it deserves a focused effort.

No doubt there will be a scoping effort as precursor to help define what should be done. Some will, rightfully complain, that this further delays actions and lots of studies have been done etc. In part I agree but in balance the studies have provide an insight into the ills but have not developed a specific road map, specific objectives let alone how measuring and reporting will be conducted.

All of this must be taken out of the CAF / DND to scope and define.

I write that knowing such a view will neither be popular nor perceived as helpful to a number of serving leaders many of whom have been (and I hope remain) very dear friends over many many decades. But nonetheless I think that step is necessary for two reasons: Firstly, it is clear that self-created solutions to date have been inadequate in scope and speed and we need some type of outside influence / support to get us to where we need to be; and secondly no effort that is generated from inside the CAF / DND will have sufficient credibility. Although the second rationale is truly a secondary consideration in fixing the problem it is nonetheless as important albeit it from a different perspective: Trust and Confidence by the GOC in a vital element of the National Security Architecture. Without straying too far from the issue it bears mentioning that trust is created over a long time based on steady reliable real-life experience. We have eroded that trust and so bring into question if the CAF can be trusted to do anything. ( I think we can but another blog on this later).

So, an outside look is needed.  What do I want to see in this.  Too often we mistake action for impact, too often elected officials look to “Branding” as substance. Neither is correct and there should be no allowance for either being mistaken for what needs to be done.

 I have a list of elements that need to be included but I do not have a sufficient understanding as of yet to be definitive in my own mind. What is clear though it must have, as a minimum, independent (meaning completely outside the CAF) reporting, investigating and follow on action authority (administrative and legal);  far better data collection on the issue; significantly increased understanding of the cultural issues base lined at all levels of Professional Development; an added criteria for appointment and promotion (two different things as one begets the other) .. the list goes on and I know it is insufficient as currently stated.

I do not think we can be too bold. I do not think we can be too invasive and pervasive in our actions. I do think we have previously underestimated the damage done by SA / SH and overestimated the cost of implementing some of the measures that were viewed previously as draconian but today should be seen as mere table stakes. Whatever short term cost and disruption is insignificant in comparison to the need and indeed the long-term benefit.

The military profession is a team sport. But it is a team that is built on series of values we have espoused but not practiced. All evidence to the contrary I continue to believe that the vast and overwhelming majority of the CAF is keen and capable of change. We, both serving and retired, are rightfully embarrassed and ashamed. We should not look to diminish, let alone dismiss, any of the realities that have led to those emotions.