I am finding that the only way I can make sense of what is happening in the CAF, as a result of great reporting, is to write it all down, try to edit and see if it captures a coherent view. I suspect I will edit this a number of times and I’ll be interested to review what I am posting today, and what I think of it in 2 weeks, 2 months or indeed 2 years from now. Much like the science of COVID I suspect as new facts emerge, I will continue to refine both what I think and how I express those thoughts. In fact, I hope that is true as that would be a mature approach. (more on that later..and how being pigeon holed on a fixed position is …well … ridiculous)
To start with I must say that however upsetting I don’t resent
a single element all of the reporting that is coming out. If you assume (as we
all must) that the issue is rife throughout the CAF ( this is not a Senior Officer issue, although
such examples best exemplify the issue) then until it gained the level of public
exposure it currently “enjoys” nothing was going to change.
At this stage I am forced to repeat what every white male of
my generation of leaders should be forced to repeat: We failed.
We failed for many many reasons but including out individual
and collective actions as well as a failure to force the change so desperately
needed. There will be attempts to explain why, and indeed there are reasons
why. There are no excuses however and the
difference in language between reasons and excuses is more than merely a nuance.
There will also be efforts to dilute the focus and create solutions that deal
with larger cultural challenges. I don’t dispute that larger cultural
challenges are being faced but the effort to widen the scope will result in a
missed opportunity and almost invariably as a result a perpetuation of a slow
and inadequate response. I fear it will be used by some to divert and distract.
Whatever the CAF / DND decides to do and whatever the GOC
decides to force upon them (and there will absolutely be elements of both) the
reality is that the issue is so clearly all pervasive that it deserves a focused
effort.
No doubt there will be a scoping effort as precursor to help
define what should be done. Some will, rightfully complain, that this further
delays actions and lots of studies have been done etc. In part I agree but in
balance the studies have provide an insight into the ills but have not
developed a specific road map, specific objectives let alone how measuring and
reporting will be conducted.
All of this must be taken out of the CAF / DND to scope and
define.
I write that knowing such a view will neither be popular nor
perceived as helpful to a number of serving leaders many of whom have been (and
I hope remain) very dear friends over many many decades. But nonetheless I
think that step is necessary for two reasons: Firstly, it is clear that self-created
solutions to date have been inadequate in scope and speed and we need some type
of outside influence / support to get us to where we need to be; and secondly no
effort that is generated from inside the CAF / DND will have sufficient
credibility. Although the second rationale is truly a secondary consideration
in fixing the problem it is nonetheless as important albeit it from a different
perspective: Trust and Confidence by the GOC in a vital element of the National
Security Architecture. Without straying too far from the issue it bears mentioning
that trust is created over a long time based on steady reliable real-life
experience. We have eroded that trust and so bring into question if the CAF can
be trusted to do anything. ( I think we can but another blog on this later).
So, an outside look is needed. What do I want to see in this. Too often we mistake action for impact, too
often elected officials look to “Branding” as substance. Neither is correct and
there should be no allowance for either being mistaken for what needs to be
done.
I have a list of elements
that need to be included but I do not have a sufficient understanding as of yet
to be definitive in my own mind. What is clear though it must have, as a
minimum, independent (meaning completely outside the CAF) reporting,
investigating and follow on action authority (administrative and legal); far better data collection on the issue; significantly
increased understanding of the cultural issues base lined at all levels of
Professional Development; an added criteria for appointment and promotion (two
different things as one begets the other) .. the list goes on and I know it is
insufficient as currently stated.
I do not think we can be too bold. I do not think we can be
too invasive and pervasive in our actions. I do think we have previously
underestimated the damage done by SA / SH and overestimated the cost of
implementing some of the measures that were viewed previously as draconian but
today should be seen as mere table stakes. Whatever short term cost and disruption
is insignificant in comparison to the need and indeed the long-term benefit.
The military profession is a team sport. But it is a team
that is built on series of values we have espoused but not practiced. All evidence
to the contrary I continue to believe that the vast and overwhelming majority
of the CAF is keen and capable of change. We, both serving and retired, are rightfully
embarrassed and ashamed. We should not look to diminish, let alone dismiss, any
of the realities that have led to those emotions.
